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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
been committed or threatened. Reprehensible conduct, that is only
socially wrong, annoying and humiliating, will not justify the granting
of an injunction.2 Equity cannot by injunction restrain conduct
merely because it injures a person's feelings and causes mental an-
guish.3 The remedy for such a situation lies in the declaratory judg-
ment which will quiet or stabilize an uncertain or disputed jural
relation either as to present or prospective obligation.4 This step will
establish the matrimonial status of litigants, and, since it is alleged that
the defendant is a resident of New York State, all the issues would be
properly adjudicated by a declaratory judgment, and plaintiff's rights
as a spouse fully protected. On the facts of the instant case, the courts
of Florida are wholly without jurisdiction to render a valid divorce
against plaintiff.5 It is not the duty of the courts of equity to regulate
unconscionable acts that result only in social and moral wrongs to a
member of society. 6 The validity of a foreign decree depends upon
jurisdiction of the marital res or of both the parties.7  In view of this
fact, equity will not issue an injunction where in the final analysis
plaintiff's .rights will be fully protected when the dispute is properly
tried.8  The plaintiff has nothing to fear from the action brought
against her by her husband in Florida, for on her own statement a
judgment entered there would be a nullity.9
E. R. D.
LABOR DISPUTE-EFFECT OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATION-
SHIP IN DETERMINING PREsENcE OR ABSENCE OF LABOR DISPUTES-
SECTION 876-a OF THE CIVIL PRACTICE AcT.-Plaintiff-employer and
an "inside" association I of his employees were granted an injunction 2
in an action against "outside" defendant union 3 picketing the employ-
er's premises. The plaintiff was an employer of retail sales clerks;
the defendant was a union of retail sales clerks which sought recogni-
2 Lowe v. Lowe, 265 N. Y. 197, 192 N. E. 291 (1934).
3 Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285 (1899); Mitchell v.
Rochester Ry., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896); Roberson v. Rochester
Folding-Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902).
4 James v. Alderton Dockyards, 256 N. Y. 298, 176 N. E. 401 (1931).
5 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525 (1906); Ball v.
Cross, 231 N. Y. 329, 132 N. E. 106 (1921).
6 Chappel v. Stewart, 82 Md. 323, 33 Atl. 542 (1896) ("The Court has nojurisdiction, * * * to enforce the performance of a moral duty, except so far as
the same is concerned with rights of property, ***).
7 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562, 26 Sup. Ct. 525 (1906).8 Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929).
9 Hdbbard v. Hubbard, 228 N. Y. 81, 126 N. E. 508 (1920).
1 Employees of plaintiff-employer belonged to an association headed by the
employer's general manager.
2 255 App. Div. 643, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 819 (2d Dept. 1939).
3 The Retail Women's Apparel Salespeople's Union, Local 1125.
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tion as the bargaining agent of the plaintiff's employees. Not a single
employee of plaintiff belonged to the defendant union. During the
union's campaign for recognition unlawful acts were committed result-
ing in arrests and convictions for unlawful conduct. Plaintiff con-
tended: that, since no employer-employee relationship existed, there
was no "labor dispute", and Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act 4
did not apply; r and that, if the ase at bar did arise out of a "labor
dispute", nonetheless, Section 876-a should not be construed to forbid
the relief which had been granted. On appeal, held, injunction modi-
fied for: there was a "labor dispute" as defined by Section 876-a of
the Civil Practice Act; the very words of the statute being that a labor
dispute shall exist "regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
relationship of employer and employee"; 6 and furthermore, extreme
violence does not negative the existence of a "labor dispute" nor does
it prevent the application of Section 876-a. The judgment should be
so modified as to strike out all the provisions except those restraining
violence, breach of the peace, and false and misleading statements;
moreover, to an injunction so modified should be added a provision
limiting the duration of the injunction to six months in accordance
with the statute. Mays Furs and Ready to Wear v. Bauer, 282 N. Y.
331, 26 N. E. (2d) 280 (1940).
The Legislature enacted Section 876-a of the Civil Practice Act
to stay the restraining hand of equity. 7 Today, before a labor union
can be enjoined from picketing, certain prescribed facts must be
pleaded and proven by the plaintiff.8 Since injunctive relief, when a
"labor dispute" exists, is permitted only after a hearing and upon the
presence of a rare combination of circumstances, 9 the lower courts
4 Remington Rand v. Crofoot, 248 App. Div. 356, 289 N. Y. Supp. 1025 (4th
Dept. 1937), aff'd, 279 N. Y. 635, 18 N. E. (2d) 37 (1938) (N. Y. CIV. PRAc.
AcT § 876-a is the anti-injunction act for labor in New York State. Its preamble
declares that the injunctive powers of the equity court " * * * had been subject
to abuse in labor litigations". The legislation was enacted to make easier the
path of labor unions, to win workers to their cause, and to make resistance to
their pressure more difficult).
5 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 876-a (it applies only to labor litigations; thus,
before it can become of use, and its anti-injunctive powers come into play, a
labor dispute must be found to exist) ; see note 9, infra; Thompson v. Boekhout,
273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674 (1937) ; Hydrox Ice Cream Co. v. Doe, 250
App. Div. 770, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1013 (2d Dept. 1937).
6 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Ac § 876-a (10-c).
7 See note 4, supra.
s Boro Park Market v. Max Heller, 280 N. Y. 481, 21 N. E. (2d) 687(1939) (pursuant to N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 876-a a verified bill of particulars
must be served, and other requirements of the statute met before an injunction
will issue); see Nevins v. Kasmach, 279 N. Y. 323, 18 N. E. (2d) 294 (1938) ;
Hydrox Ice Cream Co. v. Doe, 250 App. Div. 770, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1013 (2d
Dept. 1937).
9N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 876-a (2). "No court or judges thereof shall
have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or a temporary or permanent
injunction in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute, as herein-
after defined, except after a hearing, and except after findings of all the follow-
1940]
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seem inclined to discard the yoke imposed upon them by the statute.10
When the court finds that no "labor dispute" exists, the statute cannot
apply, and the very motivating purpose which prompted its enactment
is frustrated."- The courts then proceed to grant as drastic an injunc-
tive relief as they choose under their broad equitable powers.12 A
plethora of precedents established by the tribunals of this state conclu-
sively demonstrate that an employer and an employee need not be the
disputants in order to find the presence of a "labor dispute".' 3  At
common law the courts reasoned that, although the members of a
defendant union were not employees of a plaintiff-employer, they still
had a vital interest in that employer's labor policy because he was in
the same industry as they were.14 Other jurisdictions are in accord 15
with this rule. In the instant case the court in searching for the
touchstone to be applied to find the presence of a labor dispute said
ing facts by the court or judge or judges thereof to be filed in the record of
the case:
(a) That unlawful acts have or a breach of any contract not contrary to
public policy has been threatened or committed and that such acts or
breach will be executed or continued unless restrained;
(b) That substantial and irreparable injury to complainant's property
will follow unless the relief requested is granted;
(c) That as to each item of relief granted greater injury will be inflicted
upon complainant by the denial thereof than will be inflicted upon
defendants by the granting thereof;(d) That complainant has no adequate remedy at law;
(e) That the public officers charged with the duty to protect complain-
ant's property have failed or are unable to furnish adequate protec-
tion; and(f) That no item of relief granted prohibits directly or indirectly any
person or persons from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of
the following acts: * * *"
-(eleven categories of activities, including peaceful picketing, are then enumer-
ated which cannot be enjoined) ; Strauss v. Steiner, 173 Misc. 521, 18 N. Y. S.
(2d) 395 (1940), affd, 259 Api. Div. 725, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 75 (2d Dept. 1940).10 Lauf v. Shinner, 303 U. S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578 (1938), reV'g, 82 F. (2d)
68 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; Note (1940) 49 YaE L. J. 537; see note 4, mepra; see
note 12, infra.
11 See note 5, supra.
22 Stalban v. Friedman, 171 Misc. 106, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 343 (1939), rev'd,
259 App. Div. 520, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 978 (1st Dept. 1940) ("Plaintiff having
failed to plead or prove the facts prescribed relating to issuance of an injunction
in a labor dispute, could not be afforded relief").
13 Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 2451N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927); Nann
v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931); Stillwell v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y.
405, 182 N. E. 63 (1932); Wise Shoe Co. v. Lowenthal, 266 N. Y. 264, 194
N. E. 749 (1935); Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910
(1937).
1'4 Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (1927) ; Nann
v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931).
15 Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323, 58 Sup. Ct. 578 (1938) ; New
Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 58 Sup. Ct. 703 (1938) ;
Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 116, 60 Sup. Ct. 746 (1940) ("Peaceful picketing
is a branch of our fundamental right of free speech") ; Note (1940) 49 YALE
L. J. 537; American Furniture Co. v. Teamsters Local No. 200 of Milwaukee,
222 Wis. 338, 268 N. W. 250 (1939). '
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that, subject to constitutional restrictions, the statute as enacted will
be applied. The statute itself supplies two relevant criteria to be used.
First, the dispute, in order to be a labor dispute, must be one which
relates to conditions of employment or representation of persons in
negotiating conditions of employment.16 Second, the disputants must
be commercially participating in the same industry.17
The plaintiff contended that the statute limiting an injunction to
a period of six months was unconstitutional. The statute does not
deprive plaintiffs of property without due process of law, but prevents
the use of a stale injunction. It seeks to provide a method whereby
the injunction may be re-examined at reasonable intervals.18 Injunc-
tions are protection for the future, not punishment for the past.' 9 In-
junctions should issue to restrain only unlawful and violent methods
of the defendant, and should not include the peaceful and legal methods
sanctioned by law. The statute itself enumerates eleven categories of
activities such as peaceful picketing which may not be restrained.2 0
B.F.
PATENT ACT-SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST Ac.--Defendant corpo-
ration appeals from a decree of the District Court of the United States
for the Southern District of New York restraining it from granting
licenses to jobbers and oil refiners who sell and distribute such fuel on
the ground that such conduct violates the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.'
The corporation manufactures tetraethyl lead, a patented, poisonous,
fluid compound which, when made a part of gasoline used in high-
pressure engines, increases their efficiency. This substance is sold to
oil refiners solely for use in the production of this improved type of
motor fuel. Licenses are issued gratis to jobbers and refiners of
16 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 876-a (10-c) ("The term 'labor dispute' includes
any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning
the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, *** terms or
conditions of employment, * * *).1 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 876-a (10-b) ("A person *** shall be held to
be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought
against him * * * and if he * * * is engaged in the industry, * * * in which such
dispute occurs, or is a member, * * * or agent of any association of *** em-
ployees engaged in such industry, * * * ").
's N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act § 876-a (8) ("No permanent injunction shall
remain in force for more than six months, from the date on which the judgment
is signed, provided, however, that the duration of the injunction may be
extended for another six months, if after a further hearing initiated and con-
ducted in the same manner as the original hearing the court shall determine that
the injunction shall be continued or modified in accordance with the findings of
facts on the subsequent hearing").
'9 Nann v. Raimist, 255 N. Y. 307, 174 N. E. 690 (1931).
2o N. Y. Cxv. PRAc. Act § 876-a (1-F).
' 50 STAT. 693, 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1937).
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